This paper develops and tests arguments about how political parties' electoral fortunes in national elections are influenced by voters' preferences regarding the European Union (EU). To date, there is increasing evidence demonstrating the impact of EU issues on vote choice in national elections -a process referred to as EU issue voting. Notwithstanding, little is known about which parties actually gain or lose as a result of EU issue voting. Using a two-stage estimation procedure and employing national election survey data from Denmark, Germany, the voting is largely a function of the degree to which the EU issue is salient to political parties, the level of extremism in terms of EU positioning as well as opposition status. These findings corroborate a growing body of work that demonstrates an increasing electoral connection between European and national politics. Moreover, they strengthen our understanding of how European integration affects national electoral politics.
stretching from employment to foreign policy. Notwithstanding, his second reaction may be one of surprise or even disappointment. Monnet and other early architects of the European integration process expected citizens to rally around Europe as the unification process contributed greatly to peace, welfare and stability. Until the late 1980s, the integration process was indeed accompanied by a diffuse feeling of approval on the part of the European citizenry, characterized as the permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) . Current developments, however, cast a shadow on Monnet's initial hope of building a Union among people rather than states. Today, we are witnessing a growing discontent regarding Europe.
Although there have been downturns in support for European integration in the past, it is clear that Europeans have grown considerably more weary of the integration process than they once were (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007) . The outcomes of the recent referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands illustrate this new sentiment. At present, scholars generally agree that the age of permissive consensus has given way to a constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks, 2008) . Not only do European citizens actively monitor the course of integration, and where necessary, voice their fears and objections (Steenbergen, et al., 2007) , Euroskeptic sentiment is also increasingly being exploited by political entrepreneurs in EU referenda and national elections (Taggart, 1998; . In other words, Europe has become a contested issue. * Author's note: the author is grateful to the Danish Data Archive, the Dutch Data Archiving and Networking Services, the Zentral Archiv für Empirische Sozialforschung and the UK Data Archive for making available the data used in this paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the CONNEX European Research Colloquium Meeting 31 st of May-2 nd of June 2006, Amsterdam. The author would like to thank all participants for their input.
Remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
Indeed, recent analyses reveal that European integration has a significant effect on electoral outcomes in some EU member states (Evans 1998 (Evans , 2002 Gabel, 2000; Tillman 2004 . Voters' EU preferences do influence vote choice in national elections, a process referred to as EU issue voting . But which political parties thrive as a result of EU issue voting? On the basis of the 'sleeping giant' hypothesis developed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) , one may expect political entrepreneurs on the fringes of the political system to reap the electoral fruits of EU issue voting. The authors argue that although the electorate's ability to constrain the integration process through national elections may be limited at present, due to the restricted choice regarding the EU issue on offer by political parties, it will only be 'a matter of time before political entrepreneurs seize the opportunity to differentiate themselves from other parties in EU terms' (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004: 47) . Indeed, the literature on party positioning regarding European integration highlights the fact that the EU issue constitutes a strategic opportunity for far left and right parties to distinguish themselves from the predominantly pro-EU mainstream and thereby possibly enhance their vote share (Taggart, 1998; Marks and Wilson, 2002; Crum 2007) . Parties on the far left or right are undeniably the most pronounced Euroskeptics of all party families (Hooghe, et al., 2002) . Not only does Euroskeptism present a prospect for vote maximization, but it is also linked to the overall ideological positioning and/or anti-establishment stance of these parties (Taggart, 1998; Sitter, 2002; Ray, 2007) . This, accompanied by the fact that public opinion is on average more Euroskeptic than mainstream elites (Hooghe, 2003) , and perhaps increasingly so, makes opposition to European integration a means by which extremist parties can enhance their electoral appeal. Euroskepticism maximizes the consistency with their ideological platform, while simultaneously minimizing their distance from the median voter position (see Hinich and Munger, 1993) .
This paper addresses the important issue of the differential impact of EU issue voting on political parties' electoral fortunes at the national ballot box. It does so by means of a two-stage estimation procedure. Recent work has demonstrated the advantages of this procedure when dealing with the multi-level nature of data (Huber, et al., 2005; Stevenson, 2005, 2007; Kedar, 2005) . The empirical analysis employs national election survey data from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom from 1992 to 2002. In the first stage, I
estimate an individual-level model of vote choice modeling the impact of EU preferences for individual parties. In the second stage, I utilize party characteristics (left/right extremism, EU extremism, EU issue salience to party and opposition status) to account for cross-party variation by using an estimated dependent variable model (for further elaboration on this approach, see Lewis and Linzer, 2005) .
Interestingly, the empirical analysis shows that left/right extremism is not the decisive factor in understanding variation in EU issue voting: extreme left or right parties are not more or less affected by EU issue voting than mainstream parties. Instead EU issue voting is directly connected to a party's intrinsic position on European integration: parties for whom European integration is salient and parties with an extreme position on European integration (either pro or anti) are much more susceptible to EU issue voting. In addition, opposition parties are more likely to be subject to EU issue voting. These findings have important implications for our understanding of how European integration affects national electoral and party politics.
Moreover, they corroborate a growing body of work that demonstrates an increasing 'electoral connection' between European and national politics (Carrubba, 2001 ).
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly discuss the concept of EU issue voting.
Next, I present expectations regarding which political parties are likely to be affected by EU issue voting. In a third step, I discuss the data, the operationalizations and the method guiding the empirical analysis. The fourth section considers the results from the empirical analyses. Finally, the conclusion highlights the implications of these findings.
Conceptualizing EU issue voting
Whereas we know a lot about how national politics influences voting for the European Parliament (EP) (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Brug and Eijk, 2007) , we know much less about the way in which European integration intersects with national electoral politics Risse, 2003, 2007; Tillman 2004 ). This lack of understanding is unfortunate, as national elections constitute important channels through which citizens can communicate their interests regarding the EU. For example, government officials elected through national elections participate in the EU Council of Ministers. Additionally, elected leaders of government directly represent the interests of the member states and their citizens in the European Council (Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005 Mair, , 2007 . European integration can intersect with national voting behaviour in three different ways. To begin, EP elections potentially serve as markers for national elections; that is to say, the performance of parties in EP elections is presumed to predict how well these parties may perform in (subsequent) national elections. Although EP elections constitute 'second-order elections' (Reif and Schmitt 1980) - i.e. they are dominated by national concerns and often mirror the popularity and performance of national governments (Niedermayer, 1984; Bogdanor, 1989 ) -studies have shown that the results of European elections have altered voting behavior in subsequent national elections (see for example Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Eijk, et al., 1996; Marsh, 1998 (Palmer and Whitten, 1999; Scheve, 1999; Bohrer and Tan, 2000, Mulas-Granados, 2004 ). In the case of France and Britain, for example, Scheve (1999) shows that EMU had diverse distributional impacts for different groups within the French and British electorate, which in turn influenced their national voting behavior. Moreover, Palmer and Whitten (1999) voting is receiving increasing scholarly attention (Evans, 1998 , Gabel, 2000 Tillman, 2004; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; Van Holsteyn and De Ridder, 2005; . Although empirical evidence shows that the electorate's ability to constrain the integration process through national elections is limited in some countries due to low EU issue salience compared to traditional issues like the "welfare state" or "social justice" and due to restrictive choices on offer by political parties regarding the EU issue, researchers have found that in some countries, namely Denmark and the United Kingdom, EU issue voting is an important factor in national electoral politics (Evans, 1999 (Evans, , 2001 (Riker 1982: 209) . The EU issue provides an excellent opportunity for these parties for two reasons. First, public opinion is increasingly fickle and skeptical (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; De Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007) , and, second, "Euroenthusiasm" still constitutes the norm within the mainstream of Western European party systems. The ideological mainstream, i.e. Conservative, Social and Christian Democratic parties, are generally supportive of the integration process, as they have often been part of governing coalitions throughout Western Europe and therefore were largely responsible for the course of integration Crum, 2007) . The radical left and right, in contrast, have been at the forefront of mobilisation of Euroskeptic views in national elections (Taggart, 1998; Hooghe, et al., 2002; Sitter, 2002) .
Note that H1 does not necessarily imply that the incentives for extremist parties to mobilize anti-EU sentiment are merely strategic in nature. While it seems plausible that strategic calculation informs party change on European integration, especially for marginal parties, parties may also change their positioning because they have ideological reasons to oppose European integration. Do radical right parties, for example, oppose European integration strategically to drive a wedge in the existing party system, or does their disdain arise because European integration is the embodiment of a whole range of threats to the national community (Hooghe, et al., 2002) ? Euroskepticism may simultaneously constitute a conscious strategy by political entrepreneurs as well as be rooted in partisan ideology; indeed, these processes are most likely mutually enforcing (see Kopecky and Mudde, 2002 for a similar argumentation).
H2 (EU extremity hypothesis):
The more extreme a party's stance in terms of EU positioning, the higher the extent of EU issue voting for that party.
The second factor explaining variation in EU issue voting across parties is extremity in EU positioning. The idea here is that parties taking a clear position regarding Europe, i.e. parties that are clearly Euroskeptic or Euroenthusiast, are expected to experience higher levels of EU issue voting than parties with middling positions on Europe. This expectation draws from the work of Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) do not utilize a continuum of policy positions when evaluating parties but instead focus on a party's agreement or disagreement with their personal policy preference (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989: 94) .
Note that the directional idea does not imply that radical parties propagating the most extremist positions are expected the gain electorally. Although it is assumed that supporting intense issue positions is beneficial to a party, the directional model imposes a theoretical limitation to plausible issue stands, referred to as the 'region of acceptability' (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989: 108; MacDonald, et al., 1991 MacDonald, et al., : 1111 . The idea here is that a party's issue position must be reasonable in the eyes of (most) voters: 'A candidate must convince voters of his or her reasonableness. Voters are wary of candidates who seem radical and project harshness or stridency.' (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989 : 108) For our purposes, this penalty may be less relevant, as both Euroskepticism -defined as opposition towards the EU, its institutions or policies and/or the process of European integration (for an overview of definitions of Euroskepticism, see Ray, 2007) -as well as its antithesis Euroenthusiasm are reasonable positions upheld by both mainstream and peripheral parties throughout the EU (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks, et al., 2002) . Thus, I expect that parties with clear (i.e. extreme) preferences on the EU issue are more likely to arouse support from voters than parties with a moderate or neutral position regarding European integration (H2).
A third line of argumentation draws on saliency theory and the theory of issue ownership to argue that the extent to which a party views the EU issue as important for its electoral appeal affects its susceptibility to EU issue voting:
H3 (Salience hypothesis): The higher the EU issue salience for a party, the higher the extent of EU issue voting for that party.
Saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983 ) and the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996) inform us that political parties build their electoral appeal around issues for which they have (or could have) the support of their constituents and/or a majority of voters.
Parties make certain core issues of primary importance to their electoral campaign in order to reap electoral gains. Although issue ownership has long been regarded as fairly static, recent studies show that policy reputations are relatively flexible and, hence, open to strategic manipulation (Bélanger, 2003; Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2008) . To the extent that this is true, one would expect political parties to heighten the importance of relatively new issues, such as European integration, if they expect to be able to alter mass alignments in their favor (see also Carmines and Stimson, 1989) . Parties that play up an issue seek to persuade voters to base their voting decision on that particular issue (H3).
H4 (Opposition party hypothesis):
The extent of EU issue voting is expected to be higher among parties in opposition.
A fourth and final line of argumentation in the literature is that opposition status increases the extent to which a party is affected by EU issue voting. Because European integration is a project driven largely by governments and government parties, criticism of EU policies tends to be the privilege of opposition parties (Sitter, 2002) . Indeed, analyses show that mainstream opposition parties seem to increasingly play the anti-EU card (Sitter, 2001 (Sitter, , 2002 Ray, 2007) . The British Conservatives in recent years clearly exemplify this strategy (Evans, 1998) .
Governing parties often downplay the salience of European integration because they wish to avoid fighting elections on the issue, in part because it may bring about intra-party dissent (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Edwards, 2007; Netjes and Binnema, 2007) . Moreover, it is not easy for government parties to adopt a skeptical position on Europe given that they usually have been deeply involved in shaping the integration process in the past. Hence, outspoken opposition may lack credibility. Of course, it is possible for government parties to oppose European integration, but they run the risk of isolation and consequently ineffectiveness at the EU level. As a result, government parties find themselves confronted with a steep trade-off between Euroskepticism and government effectiveness.
In contrast, opposition parties have an interest in restructuring contestation and stressing the integration issue, as such a reorientation may bring about new voters. Moreover, an increase of the polarization on European integration by opposition parties may force government parties to take a clear-cut stance on the issue, which could destabilize the government coalition.
Consequently, I expect that opposition parties are more likely to be affected by EU issue voting than government parties (H4).
Data, operationalizations and methods
How do these four hypotheses shed light on variation among parties in their susceptibility to EU issue voting? To determine this, I need to develop a measure of the extent of EU issue voting for a party. This is a complicated procedure because one cannot observe it directly. Instead, we must estimate a measure from the data for the two variables that make up the relationship: a voter's party choice and a voter's EU preference.
In order to explore and explain variation in EU issue voting across parties, I use a twostage estimation procedure Stevenson, 2005, 2007; Kedar, 2005; Lewis and Linzer, 2005 Let us begin by explaining in some detail the multiple stages of the model. In a first step, I
conduct several individual-level multinomial logistic regression analyses to model the impact of voters' EU preferences on vote choice, while controlling for other factors. The dependent variable is vote choice for a particular party in a given election. Table A Although this new politics dimension may include diverse issues, such as political participation, gender, abortion or lifestyle issues, immigration and environmental policy are usually considered key elements of new politics (Dalton, 1996) . As with the variables presented above, the different scales were recoded to 0-1 scales, where 0 indicates fewer immigrants/less green policy and 1 indicates more immigrants/more green policy. Finally, I add several socio-economic control variables, namely gender, income and education, to the model. In the Dutch and German cases, I also incorporate religiosity. These socio-economic controls tap into the impact of cleavage structures on voting behavior.
In a second stage, I utilize the estimates from the first stage to account for the cross-party variation in EU issue voting. To ensure substantively meaningful comparability across cases I transform the first stage coefficients into predicted/expected values (see also Stevenson, 2005, 2007) . In this case, the first stage provides a predicted change in vote for a particular party due to a change in the distribution of EU preferences across voters. In the second stage, I construct the estimated dependent variable, i.e. the EU issue voting measure for a particular party, as the change in vote probability when a voter moves from fully supporting to strongly opposing European integration, while holding all other control variables at their respective means. This is done using CLARIFY, which employs Monte Carlo simulations to convert raw statistical results into more intuitive quantities without changing the statistical assumptions (King, et al., 2000) .
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Since the dependent variable in the second stage of the analysis is based on estimates, the analysis should account for the uncertainty of these estimates. Lewis and Linzer (2005) put forward a weighting procedure that produces appropriate standard errors for the second stage but also show that using White's heteroskedastic consistent standard errors is almost always as good.
Hence, I use the latter strategy. Additionally, since the extent of EU issue voting is determined using several election surveys from the same country, one might expect the level of EU issue voting for the same party to be correlated across different elections. To control for this, I grouped the data by party and calculated standard errors that allow for possible correlations between parties while assuming no correlation. Consequently, the resulting standard errors allow for unspecified forms of heteroskedasticity for the same party across the different surveys.
I regress these predicted changes in vote probability against several party characteristics gleaned from the Ray (1996) , Marks/Steenbergen (1999) status of a party using a dummy variable indicating if the party was in opposition during the year prior to the election. This measure was determined using Siaroff (2000) and official government websites. Table 1 below summarizes the indicators used to operationalize the dependent and independent variables employed in the first and second stage of the empirical analysis.
--- Table 1 --- Table 2 about here ---In order to compare these coefficients across the cases, I transform the first stage coefficients into changes in predicted/expected values. To do so, I calculate the change in vote probability when the a voter moves from strongly opposing European integration to fully supporting it, while holding all other variables at their respective means 5 . This allows for a straightforward comparison of the extent to which a party's vote probability is influenced by EU issue voting across parties and elections. Figure 1 below shows the extent of EU issue voting across parties in a given election. Positive values indicate an increase in the expected vote probability of a party as a result of an increasingly Euroskeptic voter, while negative values indicate a decrease in the expected vote probability.
--- Figure 1 about here ---Note that these are maximum effects which may not always be entirely realistic.
Notwithstanding, these maximum effects do give a good sense of the variation in EU issue voting across parties in the data. Moreover, the data do indicate that a substantial number of respondents place themselves at the end-points of the EU scale.
The Danish Social Democrats and Liberals experienced the highest change in vote probability as a result of a voter's EU preference moving from its minimum to its maximum levels. In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party ( Why are certain parties more susceptible to EU issue voting, while others are less so?
Hypotheses H1 through H4 point to four factors, which I now test in an OLS regression using the 5 I also performed the analysis while holding the control variables that are dummies at their respective medians.
Note that this did not substantially change the results.
absolute changes in expected vote probabilities as the dependent variable. Table 3 below presents the results.
--- Table 3 about here ---
The results strongly support the theoretical conjectures formalized in hypotheses H2, H3
and H4. The findings show that variation in the effect of EU issue voting across parties is largely a function of the degree to which the EU issue is salient to a respective party, extremity in terms of EU positioning as well as opposition status. Overall, these factors explain almost half, i.e. 46 percent, of the variance in EU issue voting across parties. The strongest predictor of EU issue voting is the extent to which a party renders the EU issue salient. A one-unit increase in EU issue salience results in a .08-point increase in EU issue voting -a shift of 8.0 percentage points in EU issue voting. The EU salience finding is in keeping with both saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie, 1983 ) and the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996) . Parties seem to be able to strategically raise the salience of the European integration issue in order to boost EU issue voting.
Extremity in terms of EU positioning also increases the extent of EU issue voting. A oneunit increase in EU extremity leads to a .03-point increase in EU issue voting -a shift of 3.0 percentage points in EU issue voting. So, in line with a directional view on issue voting, parties that take either a clear Euroskeptical or Euroenthusiast stance may benefit from EU issue voting.
While vote choice for parties that have a middling position regarding European integration within the party system are least influenced by a voter's EU preference. Finally, the expected value of EU issue voting is .04-point higher for opposition parties than for government parties.
This finding indicates that EU issue voting is part of a government-opposition dynamic.
Opposition parties are influenced to a larger extent by EU issue voting than are government parties.
The results in table 3 do not support the hypothesis that the more extreme a party's position in terms of left/right ideology, the higher the extent of EU issue voting for that party (H1). The coefficient for left/right extremism is in the expected direction but is not significant.
Apparently, the fact that a party is on the far left or far right does not significantly influence the extent to which that party is affected by EU issue voting. How can we make sense of this surprising finding? One plausible explanation is that although far left and right parties frequently oppose Europe and mobilize public sentiment against it (De Vries and Edwards, 2008) , the EU issue rarely constitutes their main electoral appeal (Taggart, 1998; Mair, 2000) . These parties are likely to be 'parties whose identity is tied up with particular issues (e.g., ecology, immigration) and for whom the EU is a secondary concern' (Taggart, 1998: 384) . The Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn-LPF) is exemplary in this respect. Although the LPF party platform was clearly Euroskeptic, public safety and immigration policy were the key concerns in their 2002 electoral campaign and clearly overshadowed the EU issue (Pennings and Keman, 2003; Van Holsteyn, et al., 2003; Kleinnijenhuis, et al., 2003) . Hence, far left and right parties often have other "powerful strings on their bows". Since European integration is clearly not paramount to national political parties, parties on the fringes will more likely devote their attention to their key "own" issues, such as immigration or their critique of neo-liberal policy (see also Taggart, 1998; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004; Netjes and Binnema, 2007) .
Overall, the findings show that once we control for other party characteristics, the location of a party on the left-right spectrum does not matter for EU issue voting. Instead EU issue voting is directly connected to a party's intrinsic position on European integration: parties for whom European integration is salient and parties with an extreme position on European integration (either pro or anti) are much more susceptible to EU issue voting. In addition, opposition parties are more likely to be subject to EU issue voting. So, these findings refine previous research which has shown the important role of political entrepreneurs on the fringes of the political spectrum in facilitating EU issue voting . The sheer fact that a party is on the far left or far right does not automatically increase the extent to which that party is affected by EU issue voting. Rather, the degree to which a party is affected by EU issue voting largely depends on the extremity of the EU stance a party takes (i.e. is the party clearly Euroskeptic or Euroenthusiastic), if it sits in opposition and the degree to which a party views the EU issue as important for its electoral appeal. Although, EU issue voting is not necessarily being driven by extremist parties, these parties have generally devoted the most energy to the EU issue and have thus reaped the greatest rewards so far.
Concluding remarks
Which parties are affected by EU issue voting and why? This paper has taken an important step in understanding the way in which the process of European integration within national political arenas potentially alters mass-elite linkages at the time of election. Two main conclusions emerge from the analyses. First, there is considerable variation in the extent to which political parties are influenced by EU issue voting. Secondly, this variation in EU issue voting is largely a function of the degree to which the EU issue is salient to a respective party, the level of EU extremism and opposition status. While the literature on EU issue voting and party positioning regarding European integration thus far put forward the idea that political entrepreneurs on the fringes of the political system are expected to prosper as a result of EU issue voting, the results reported here show that extremism in terms of left/right ideology is not the decisive factor in understanding the variation in EU issue voting across parties. The findings indicate that the more salient the EU issue is to a party, the larger the impact of EU issue voting. Also, the more extreme a party is in terms of its EU positioning, the higher the extent of EU issue voting.
Finally, EU issue voting constitutes a government-opposition dynamic, as opposition parties benefit from EU issue voting significantly more than government parties. Thus, EU issue voting seems directly related to a party's intrinsic position regarding European integration, i.e. the salience and extremity of that position, as well as its opposition status.
Naturally, this study has limitations. A comprehensive understanding of how EU issue voting varies across parties should also account for cross-national variation. This would enable us to bring in the strategic context in which parties operate. For example, do party system characteristics matter when it comes to EU issue voting? Moreover, it may also prove worthwhile to compare these findings regarding EU issue voting to issue voting in other areas, such as immigration or the environment. These topics will have to be addressed in future research.
Despite limitations, the results presented here expand our understanding of how European integration affects national electoral politics. The study adds to the body of work that demonstrates an increasing 'electoral connection' between European and national politics (Carrubba, 2001) . That is to say, by influencing national vote choice EU preferences create differential impacts on parties' electoral fortunes. The analysis highlights that parties can strategically use the EU issue to their electoral benefit. For example, by "naming or shaming" or by increasing the importance of EU issues in their electoral campaigns, parties may reap the electoral benefits of EU issue voting. 
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Notes:
The values on the y-axis denote the change in the expected vote probability P(v) for a party as a function of an increasing Euroskeptic voter (i.e. when a voter's EU preference move from their maximum to their minimum level). Positive values indicate an increase in the expected vote probability of a party as a result of an increasing Euroskeptic electorate, while negative values indicate a decrease in the expected vote probability. The individual parties are labelled by an acronym followed by the election year. For full details on the parties included in each country and election, the reader is referred to table A.1 in the appendix. 
